In October of 2003, Steve Jobs, the cofounder and CEO of the wellknown computer and technology company Apple, 1 underwent a routine abdominal scan. 2 During this scan, doctors found an abdominal tumor; 3 a biopsy of the tumor revealed that Jobs had pancreatic cancer. 4 While pancreatic cancer is very often a death sentence, 5 Jobs was lucky. Doctors found that he had a rare, more treatable form and that successful surgical removal of the tumor would most likely lead to at least ten more years of life. 6 After going against his doctors' orders by pursuing alternative treatments for nine months, Jobs underwent surgery to remove the tumor from his pancreas in July 2004 at Stanford University Medical Center in Palo Alto, Califomia. 7 A few years following his surgery, Jobs had complications and needed a liver transplant. 8 He underwent this procedure in April of 2009. 9 The fact that a well-known businessman or celebrity received a liver transplant is not noteworthy in itself. In this case, however, Jobs' transplant surgery took place at a hospital located in Tennessee, approximately 2,000 miles from his home in Northern California. 10 Media coverage often undermines the American public's trust in the organ transplant system. 11 The American public often assumes that celebrities or other well-known people get preferential treatment when waiting for an organ transplant. 12 In 1995, professional baseball legend Mickey Mantle received a liver transplant only forty-eight hours after being placed on the waitlistP Mantle then died two months later! 4 In Mantle's case, media attention was great, and the public, along with numerous medical ethicists, debated whether he should have even received the transplant. 15 Cases such as this one may lead the public to view the organ transplant system as unfair and inequitable. This may lead to a decrease in the number of people who are willing to donate their organs for transplantation to a system that is already short on donors. 16 Media coverage of Steve Jobs' liver transplant may have the same effect on potential donors.
In the current system, patients with better resources and a better understanding of how the system functions may be able to use this information to improve their likelihood of receiving an organ transplant. 17 The median wait time for a liver between 2002 and 2007 varied widely between various Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs); the national average was just over one year, 18 while some OPOs wait time was as high as three years. 19 However, the OPO from which Steve Jobs received his liver for transplant had a median wait of just over four months, 20 while the median wait time before liver transplant for patients between July 1, 2003 and December 31, 2008 at the University of California at Los Angeles Medical Center (a hospital performing liver transplants in Jobs' home state of California) was 25.6 months.2 1
A. Thelssue
While some might assume that Jobs received preferential treatment due to his financial and celebrity status, it is more likely that he placed himself on the waiting lists at multiple transplant centers. 22 The United Network for Organ Sharing (''UNOS") conducts periodic audits of transplant centers to ensure that candidates are not given preferential treatment over others on the list for nonmedical reasons.2 3 Some patients receive an organ 13 . Daubert, supra note 11, at 478; see also Hainer, supra note 1. 14. Daubert, supra note 11, at 478 for transplantation more quickly than others do because they are "standing in more lines" by placing themselves on the waiting list at multiple transplant centers. 24 UNOS is fully aware of this practice and expressly allows patients to list themselves at multiple transplant centers. 25 Further, UNOS allows these listings to be performed at centers located in different geographical locations that are served by different OPOs.2 6 This rule allows a patient like Steve Jobs to potentially decrease the time they spend waiting to get a transplant. Many patients, however, are unable to be listed at multiple transplant centers due to cost. 27 In fact, many patients cannot afford the costs associated with transplantation when listed at just a single transplant center? 8 The current estimated cost of a liver transplant is $519,600. 29 This cost prohibits approximately one-third of Americans from obtaining the transplant they need due to insufficient insurance, or a total lack thereof. 30 Nevertheless, while many patients are hindered by the financial requirements of transplantation, those with large financial assets, like Jobs, are able to use the assets to their advantage. To be evaluated at multiple centers, one must have the financial and physical resources to travel around the country. 31 The monetary requirement includes the ability to pay all the costs associated with multiple evaluations, as many insurance plans do not cover the cost of examination and evaluation at more than one transplant center. 32 Further, one must have the financial means to travel to any transplant center across the country at a moment's notice when the needed organ becomes available. Lastly, at some transplant centers the ability to pay for a transplant is a prerequisite to being placed on the wait list. 33 Because Steve Jobs' estimated worth is approximately twenty-two billion dollars, 34 the financial and travel issues were not constraining factors, allowing him to take advantage of the fact that UNOS does not prohibit patients from listing themselves on multiple waiting lists around the country. 35 
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WORKING THE SYSTEM 233 Steve Jobs received a liver transplant in a very short amount of time at a transplant center halfway across the country from his home. While the initial, instinctive reaction is to condemn Jobs as unfairly "pushing" his way to the front of the line, the fact of the matter is that he simply followed the express conditions and guidelines of the UNOS policy that allow transplant patients to list themselves at multiple transplant centers. 36 Presumably, Jobs did what any other person with sufficient financial and physical means would have done. Nonetheless, the heart of the issue centers on the question of whether this "multiple lists" policy allows the wealthy a better, yet unfair, opportunity to receive an organ transplant. Further, even if the current system does allow an advantage to the wealthy, are there sufficient reasons to maintain the status quo?
B. Roadmap
This Note discusses the practice of patients in need of organ transplants placing themselves on waitlists at multiple transplant centers located around the country. To facilitate understanding of this practice, Section II describes the history of the organ transplant system in the United States, including a discussion of the reasons for implementation of current laws. Section IT also includes a description of the current structure and functioning of the organ transplantation process by discussing the relationship between organ transplant centers and organ procurement organizations, and by giving a detailed explanation of UNOS policies that regulate organ allocation. Finally, this section highlights differences in the way that various organ procurement organizations function in distinct areas of the United States. Section III analyzes arguments for maintaining the status quo and for disallowing multiple wait listing. Finally, the Note concludes that cur-. rent UNOS policies allowing patients to list themselves at multiple transplant centers is the best option.
II. THE HISTORY AND FuNCTIONING OF THE

ORGAN TRANSPLANT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES
In order to determine whether listings at multiple centers should be allowed by transplant seeking patients, a full understanding of the history and functioning of the Organ Transplant System in the United States is necessary. This section explains the general history of the transplant system and describes legislation regarding the current functioning of the organ transplant process, including a discussion of the differences that occur in various geographical locations across the country. 36 . ld. 
A. History
Researchers began experimenting with the science of organ transplantation in animals and humans in the eighteenth century. 37 The first successful human kidney transplant was performed in 1954 and the first successful human liver transplant followed in 1967. 38 Nowadays, transplantation of kidneys, hearts, livers, lungs, pancreases, intestines, and other organs has become routine medical procedure. 39 During the initial development years of human organ transplant science in the 1950's and 1960's, the decisions, procedures, and policies concerniil.g procurement. and allocation of human organs were controlled and made by the medical community 40 because there were no transplant-specific state or federal laws that governed the process. 41 As the science of transplantation progressed, 42 transplant departments at hospitals formed organizations to collect organs from donors. 43 These Organ Procurement Organizations ("OPOs'') were also responsible for distributing donated organs to patients in need. 44 Without centralized regulation, OPOs developed in different ways with significant variation among the different organizations. 45 These variations include differences in the number of organs procured, the number of transplants performed at the transplant hospital where the organs are allocated, and the average and median time patients spend on the waitlist until a transplantable organ is found. 46 Further, there were many private transplantation networks serving specific self-determined regions that all functioned independently of one another. 47 As a result, there were numerous geographical gaps and overlaps in the organ transplant system. 48 
2011]
WORKING TilE SYSTEM 235 centers at al1. 49 Because of the difficulties presented by the lack of regulation, legislators began enacting state laws addressing organ donation in the 1960s. 50 Federal legislation followed, enacted in the 1980s. 51 The main purpose of the federal legislation was to intervene in the organ allocation process. 52 At this time the federal government acknowledged the progress in the science of human organ transplantation and changed the characterization of heart and liver transplants from "experimental" to "medically appropriate. " 53 Because of this change transplant procedures were eligible for coverage under Medicare, Medicaid, and private third-party insurance, making the procedures accessible to more Americans in need. 54 Prompted by the rublic's concern about the difficulties of obtaining an organ for transplant, 5 as well as medico-ethical issues arising in organ transplantation, Congress enacted the National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984 (''NOTA"). 5 6 As transplantation became increasingly common, the practice of buying and selling organs through organ brokers became more popular. 5 7 Congress felt that the buying and selling of human organs for transplant was against society's ethical and moral values and called the process "supply-side cannibalism. " 58 Congress was also fearful that allowing such a system would make the "poor a source of spare parts for the rich. " 59 As a result, this federal statute expressly prohibited the commodification of human organs for transplantation. 60 The statute makes it ''unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consid.eration.' 761 Violation of this statute may lead to either imprisonment not greater than five years or fines no greater than $50,000, or both. 62 The term "valuable consideration" does not include 49 Congress had three major goals in passing NOT A. It aimed to articulate a national health policy for. organ transplantation, to ensure equitable allocation of donor organs, and to increase the number of organs available for transplantation. 64 In order to help achieve these goals, Congress created the Task Force on Organ Transplantation, which recommended a system for equitable organ allocation. 65 The most significant aspect of this system was the establishment of the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network ("OPTN''). 66 Medical professionals of the transplant community operate the OPTN. Such operation allows medical judgment to remain paramount while assisting OPOs to ensure equitable allocation of organs on a nationwide basis. 67 Under NOTA, the OPTN is required to: 1) Maintain a national organ waiting list of organ transplant candidates; 2) Match cadaveric organs with the patients on the waiting list; 3) Establish policies concerning organ allocation; 4) Set quality standards for acquisition and transplantation of organs; 5) Coordinate transportation of organs from OPOs to transplant hospitals; 6) Analyze and publish data concerning transplantation; and 7) Report comparative costs and outcomes concern-63. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (c) (2) 72 In 1986, federal law made membership with the OPTN and compliance with its policies a prerequisite for payment from Medicare for all hospitals and OP0s. 73 This was the first time .a national entity -UNOS, operating under the United States Department of Health and Human Services' ("HHS") oversight -was charged with developing legally enforceable allocation policies for all hospitals and transplant hospitals across the United States. 74 Congress believed that funding a national transplant network could resolve many of the inequities that existed in the organ transplant system. 75 Congress also believed that a centralized computer network would do a better job of matching donors and recipients and that this .better matching system would also lead to less donor organs waste. 76 Although Congress had good intentions in creating the centralized list and matching system, data collected over the first few years of use showed that some patients were receiving organs sooner than others. 77 Correlations were found between differences in waiting period and geographic location, blood type, ethnicity, and recipient age. 78 Even worse, data showed that organs were not being consistently given to the patients that were the sick-INDIANAHEALTHLAWREVIEW [Vol. 8:229 est or nearest to death. 79 In 1998, HHS released a Final Rule concerning these differences. 80 While this rule did not establish a specific organ allocation system or express rules, 81 it did direct the OPTN to develop goals for standardized listing criteria to ensure that candkWes would be grouped by medical urgency and that organs would be allOcated to the sickest patients. 82 
B. Current Structure and Functioning of the Organ Transplantation Process
In 1999, UNOS developed UNet, the first secure Internet organ transplant database. 83 It is used, to match organ donors and recipients and to manage transplant data. 84 After procuring· an organ from a donor, the OPO will enter it into the UNei database and UNOS determines to which patient the organ will be offered first. 85
The Relationship Between Transplant Centers and Organ Procurement Organizations
A transplant center is simply .a medical facility. that performs organ transplantation. 86 As ofMarcJt 6, 2010, there were 249.transplant centers in the United States maintaining one or more transplant programs. 87 Many of these centers offer multiple transplant programs. As of that date, there were 1,135 different transplant programs operating at these 249 centers across the country. 88 The transplant programs receive their organs for transplant from OPOs. OPOs are non-profit organizations that are responsible for approaching family members of deceased persons to discuss the option of organ donation, evaluating medical suitability of. possible organ donors, coordinating recovery, preservation, and transportation of organs to be used for transplantation, and educating the public about the need for organ donation. 93 This division allows its members to facilitate organ allocation and to provide individuals with the opportunity to identify concerns regarding organ procurement, allocation, and transplantation that are unique to their particular geographic area. 94 With the exception of perfectly matched donor kidneys, donated organs are offered to recipients in the area from which the organ was procured (where the donation was made) before they are offered toother parts of the country. 95 UNOS follows this system in order to reduce the time that an organ must be preserved after donation, improve organ quality and survival outcome, reduce the costs associated with transplantation, and increase access to transplantation. 96
UNOS Policy for Organ Allocation
UNOS policies prescribe the method in which different organs are to be allocated. 97 Although UNOS allows patients to list themselves on waiting lists at multiple transplant centers for any organ transplant needed, 98 this discussion will include only the policies specific to liver allocation for the purposes of simplicity and consistency. 99 ric patients, 100 the discussion below examines only the policies as they relate to adult patients. However, all portions of UNOS policy pertinent to this discussion are included below.
UNOS Policy 3.6 governs the process of allocating donor livers to patients on the waiting list. 101 Compliance with these policies is mandatory/ 02 and UNOS conducts audits when appropriate. 103 After being placed on a transplant hospital's waiting list, candidates are categorized (and eventually chosen to receive the donor organ) using two methods: status code or probability of candidate death. 104 Physicians at the transplant center perform patient classification and scoring. 105 If an·adult patient is given a status code, he or she will be given a code of lA or 7. 106 A patient is assigned a status code of 7 when he or she. is determined to be temporarily unsuitable for a transplant and is not considered for organ allocation. 107 A patient is classified as lA when he or she is determined to have "fulminant liver failure with a life expectancy without a liver transplant of less than 7 days." 108 When a patient does not fit the criteria to be placed in a given status code, he or she may still receive an organ based on probability of death. 112 A mortality risk score is determined by the physician using different medical prognostic factors 113 as provided by the Model for End-Stage Liver Disease (MELD} Scoring System. 114 Once given a MELD score, patients are then grouped by blood type. 115 Within each MELD score, donor livers are offered to patients who have an identical blood type match first, followed by those patients who are blood-type compatible, followed by patients who are blood-type incompatible with the donor. 116 Once a patient is listed and given a status code or MELD score, he or she must wait for a donor organ. 117 As a patient's health changes, the scores and categorization of the patient will change. 118 UNOS requires doctors to reassess and recertify patients' status code and probability of death determination at a predetermined frequency depending upon the last score or categorization. 119 When a liver becomes available, it is offered to patients based on their current status code or MELD score according to the following algorithm. Patients listed at a transplant hospital located in the same geographic region from where the organ was harvested with a status code of lA are considered first by descending point total. 120 Next, candidates in the same geographic region are considered by descending MELD score. 121 Finally, if there are no regional patients that are able to take the donor liver, 122 the liver is offered to patients in the same priority on a nationallevel.123 pdfs/policy_8.pdf(last updated Nov. 9, 2010) (Time spent on the waiting list only accrues while the patient is active (suitable for transplant). Ten points are awarded to the patient that has been waiting the longest period and proportionately fewer points are accrued by those patients who have been waiting a shorter period of time. As noted above, when determining organ allocation, the criterion given the greatest weight is medical urgency.· However, when these factors place potential recipients into the. same status, a recipient that is "regional" will receive preference over those patients who are not. Yet, these UNOS guidelines do not govern the transplant process until after the patient is on the waiting list. 124 While much attention is given to the shortage of donated organs as compared to the number. of potential recipients. on the waitlist, attention should also be paid to the process of adding one's name to the waitlist. According to Arthur Caplan, Ph.D., the chair of the Department of Medical Ethics at the University of Pennsylvania, ''The system works at two levels .... One, who gets in to a [transplant] center. Two, who gets transplanted off a particular center's list when an organ becomes available. Most of the attention goes to stage two, but the biggest ethical challenges are really at stage one." 125
Not All Organ Procurement Organizations Are Created Equal
If all transplant centers had similar access to organs, patients needing an organ transplant would gain no advantage by listing themselves on multiple waiting lists. This, however, is not the case. · The problem -or the advantage for some patients -is that not all OPOs are created equal. Some regions contain nearly fifteen times as many people as others, and their waiting list times vary widely. Patients in small OPOs tend to be. less sick and experience shorter wait times before getting an organ. 126 Examining the performance ofthe fifty-eight OPOs across the United States shows a significant variation among them. 
Not All Transplant Centers Are Created Equal
Even if all OPOs were able to provide donor organs equally to all transplant centers, a ciifficulty for patients would remain. Not all transplant centers provide the same transplant services. In other words, not all transplant hospitals have programs for transplantation of all organs. In addition, waitlist numbers and procedures performed vary greatly between centers. Further, as shown by Tables 4 and 5 
UNOS Allows Multiple Listings
Current UNOS Policies and Bylaws expressly allow patients in need of an organ transplant to be listed on multiple waiting lists. 133 In fact, each transplant program must inform all patients of the option to be listed at multiple centers upon accepting that patient onto its waiting list. 134 In order to avoid inefficiencies, UNOS policies prescribe procedures to remove a patient from all of the lists he or she is on soon after that patient receives a transplant or dies. 135 One possible way to stop the potential inequities of the current system would be to limit patients to listing themselves at local transplant centers only. If the current system for organ allocation and transplantation should be changed, now might be an opportune time to do so. An overhaul of health care in the United States is currently underway, 136 and legislators have a prime opportunity to change systems that they find inefficient as the changes called for in the law are being shaped. However, the appropriateness of the timing alone does not mean that the system should be changed. The system should be changed only if the changes would prove to be advantageous to the general transplant patient population overall.
SRTR, CENTENNIAL MEDICAL CENTER
A. Arguments in Favor of Allowing Patients to
Place Themselves on Multiple Waitlists
Patient Autonomy in Treatment Choices
The marketplace in the United States is generally based on a "freemarket" system. 137 This system allows consumers to choose the products and services that they wish to purchase. 138 This freedom of consumer choice may create incentives for companies and individuals who sell goods and services to create the highest quality products at the lowest possible price. 139 This freedom of choice is also a notable aspect of the United States health care system. Like the free market system in place for consumer goods, this system likely gives doctors and hospitals incentive to provide the highest quality of care. While prices in healthcare are more likely to be determined by, or in the least influenced by, the federal government (by setting payment schedules for Medicare) and private insurance and third party payers, the quality of patient care will still be affected by this freedom of choice. In the end, patient safety and quality outcomes are the most important aspects of health care.
As shown previously in this note, OPOs functioning in different re- Tables 1 and 2 showed the different amounts of organs that are recovered throughout the region that each OPO served. Table 3 showed that some OPOs function at levels below the national average and others exceed national figures. Further, Tables 4 and 5 showed that different transplant centers have different outcomes in their transplantation programs. These outcome based differences include the number of transplants performed, the way the actual number of transplants performed compared to the number of expected transplants the hospital, and varying outcomes from the actual transplant surgery, which include graft survival rates and, more importantly, patient survival rate one-year post surgery.
Patients who are on a waitlist for organ transplant are often in a life or death situation. If they do not receive the organ they need, death may be the likely outcome. On the other hand, receiving a necessary organ can be a sort of "stay of execution" in that it places the patient in a situation where a return to healthy living is possible to some extent. In almost any other situation where an adult patient is in need of medical treatment, the patient is granted the right to consent, or deny consent, for that treatment. 141 If all financial variables are set aside, and the patient consents to treatment, he or she should have the right to choose from which doctor to seek treatment. Undoubtedly, this decision is made by weighing multiple factors including, but not limited to, treatment availability and outcomes, rapport with the doctor and surgeon, the experience or expertise of the doctor and surgeon, and hospital reputation. The current system permitting patients to list themselves at multiple transplant hospitals reserves the patient's decisionmaking autonomy by allowing the patient to determine what doctors and surgeons he or she feels most comfortable with. The current system also allows the patient to seek transplant centers with the best outcomes. Because different OPOs function at different levels, requiring a patient to only be listed at the nearest transplant center may force the patient to be treated at a center that provides a lesser chance of survival. Certainly if a patient is allowed to make the choice of which doctor to go to for a simple yearly physical examination, the same autonomy should be allowed in a decision with the gravity of life and death.
While many patients do -have health insurance, it may not cover the entire expense of organ transplantation surgery or aftercare. gans, but it does not cover all the costs associated with the transplant. 142 Private insurance, similar to Medicare, often offers incomplete coverage of transplant costs. 143 This incomplete coverage may preclude patients, under private insurance or Medicare, from receiving a transplant at a hospital out of their financial reach. The current system would allow a patient to place him or herself on waitlists at transplant centers that are most affordable in his or her financial situation. A system that would require patients to go to their local center might price patients out of the ability to have their surgery.
As previously mentioned, many transplant hospitals do not perform transplants of every organ. Further, the type of available organs varies widely between different geographic areas of the United States. 144 A regulation limiting patients to listing themselves with local centers may bar some patients from the surgery they would need to live based solely on availability. Clearly, a regulation having this effect would require an exception for a patient in such a situation.
The criteria used to decide whether or not to place a patient on a wait list vary between physicians and transplant centers. 145 In addition, because UNOS does not have regulations that mandate how transplant centers operate, there can be a large variation in transplant center practices. 146 The current system allows patients to find a surgeon and transplant center that have criteria the patient satisfies so he or she can be placed on the wait list. Also, the system allows patients to list themselves at transplant centers where they feel most confident in the transplant process. A system allowing only local wait listing might both keep patients in need from getting on a wait list (if they were not able to satisfy the requirements for entrance onto the local list) and force patients to list themselves at a facility where they are not confident in the possible outcome.
To alleviate the problems that would arise in limiting patients to only list themselves at the local transplant center, UNOS could limit each patient to one entry on a waiting list without geographic limitation. However, in this situation the argument for inequality would still exist, because patients with modest financial means would be unable to travel to a transplant center located far from their home, while a wealthy patient could travel to different centers and decide which gave him or her the best opportunity for a sue- 145. See generally ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 16, at 403-4 (suggesting that different transplant centers give different weight to factors including, but not limited to, the likelihood of successful surgery, ability to pay, benefit the particular patient will gain from the transplant, organ rejection, quality of life, cause of organ failure (such as alcoholism in liver failure), concomitant illness, age, drug abuse, and mental status).
146. UNOS Rationale for Objectives of Equitable Organ Allocation, supra note 144.
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WORKING THE SYSTEM 249 cessful outcome. Thus, limiting a patient to only one listing based on geography does not alleviate the possibility of inequality between the rich and the poor. While the current system can be criticized for potential inequality due to fmancial means, it appears to be better than these other two options. The first alternative infringes upon patient autonomy in treatment and potentially decreases successful outcomes by forcing patients to wait at a particular center irrespective of organ availability in that region, center procedure, and outcome statistics. The second alternative does not alleviate the latent inequality that may exist within the present system.
Multiple Wait Listing May Potentially Help Patients Who Are Only on a Single List
One might argue that the current system creates an inequality that favors the wealthy; however, this system has the potential to help those listed only on a single local list as well. A wealthy patient who gets a necessary organ transplant at a center outside of his or her locality will then be removed from (or not even placed on) the locallist. 147 For ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy _ 4.pdf (last updated Nov. 9, 2010) ("Transplant centers will be notified through the UNet system when a multiple listed candidate has been transplanted or reported as deceased by another center so that all other centers involved can investigate and request removal of the candidate from the center's Waiting List.").
148. The counter to this argument is that Patient X took an organ from a third patient listed at Transplant Hospital 2-5 who only had the financial means to list himself at one of these transplant hospitals. See disc\lSSion infra at Part III.B.2.
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Economic Argument
Allowing those with the financial and physical means to place themselves on multiple waitlists can benefit society. Steve Jobs' case is a good example of this. Apple is a company that has benefitted greatly from its CEO's actions. 149 Jobs was one of the founding fathers of the company and under his leadership Apple's worth has grown from $5 billion in 2000 to $170 billion in 2009. 150 If Jobs was limited to a single wait list, he likely would have undergone his transplant later or died. Under either of these scenarios, Apple would have suffered with the loss or prolonged illness of its CE0. 151 Allowing someone with the financial means to decrease the time spent waiting for a transplant improved the lives of those who benefit from Apple products.
The current system also has a financial impact on the public. If Jobs was not able to return to his company as quickly as he did (or if he died as a result of not receiving a transplant), Apple's stock prices might have decreased further, and those with money in the market would have suffered if they had invested in Apple. More directly, Apple is a large corporation that employs 34,000 people. 152 If the company would have suffered further, many of its employees could have lost their jobs. Further, someone left unemployed may also be left without health insurance, and if she also needed a transplant, she may be left with no ability to pay for the procedure. As previously discussed, inability to pay may preclude a patient from even being entered onto a wait list, 153 and death may occur as a result. Obviously, not every organ recipient has as direct an impact on the economy as Steve Jobs does. However, a recipient who has the financial means to place him or herself on multiple waitlists ·likely does effect the economy in a similar manner, only on a smaller scale. Further, in the case that another prominent figure in the business world is in need of an organ transplant, allowing him or her to be placed on multiple waitlists will allow the same positive economic benefit. The time interval between procurement of an organ from the donor and surgical transplant into the patient is referred to as "cold ischemia time." 154 As cold ischemia time increases, the likelihood of successful organ transplantation decreases. 155 Therefore, one important factor in minimizing waste of organs is to ensure that they are transplanted as quickly as possible in order to keep cold ischemia time to a minimum.
As described above, 156 UNOS policies for organ allocation offer an organ to the patient with a status code of IA and the highest point total who is at a hospital located in the same vicinity where the organ is procured. 157 If the transplant surgeon decides that the organ received is not suitable for transplant in a particular patient, the organ is allocated to the next best candidate.15g Often, this candidate may be at a different transplant center.
When this occurs, the donor organ must be transported to the center. After being offered locally, the organ is then offered on a nationwide basis. 159 Obviously, as the distance between the donation site and the transplant center that accepts the organ increases, the time taken to transport the organ increases. While this process occurs, the time that the donor organ goes without perfusion of blood (the cold ischemia time) increases and the likelihood of successful transplantation decreases. Because the transplant surgeon ultimately decides whether an organ is appropriate for transplantation into a patient based on his or her ·medical judgment, and because the amount of cold ischemia time is one predictor of successful transplantation, it is highly likely that a sui:geon will decline an organ that has a high cold ischemia time. After an organ is declined for transplant into the first potential recipient, it becomes increasingly likely that the organ may not be used due to cold ischemia time. What was initially a valuable organ can become unusable and therefore wasted.
Allowing multiple listing can help decrease the chance of wasted or- gans due to increased cold ischemia time by placing a patient who may be the best fit for a transplant in multiple localities. The same financial resources that allowed the patient to list him or herself at transplant centers across the country will also usually allow him or her to travel quickly to the area where the donor organ is procured. In other words, if a perfectly matched organ is procured at a distance from the patient's home, he or she can travel quickly to the center during the procurement process to the local hospital in that area to decrease cold ischemia time. When this occurs, the organ will be offered to a patient who is a perfect fit rather than the next patient down the list who may not have been as good a fit. The chance of the transplant surgeon declining the organ will decrease, thus decreasing the possibility of organ wasting. In the case of Steve Jobs, it was determined that he would be the best match for an organ procured in Tennessee. His financial means allowed him to travel from California to Tennessee quickly enough to keep the cold ischemia time of the donor liver to a minimum, allowing for a successful transplantation. Further, by placing himself on multiple lists, Jobs was able to minimize the problem of a high cold ischemia and increase the likelihood that an organ matching his specific needs would be found. When an organ matches well with the recipient, the chances of a surgeon declining it are usually minimal and the organ will not go to waste.
b. Maximum survival rates (I) Better matching between donor organ and recipient.
In order for survival rates to remain high, organs must be matched well to recipients. 160 When an organ becomes available, it is first offered to a patient with a lA status code and the highest point score in the same locality from which the donor organ was procured. 161 As discussed above, 162 when a patient appears on multiple lists, the chance that an organ will go to a well matched recipient increases because he or she is considered based on medical criteria rather than geographic location. Thus, the organ is more likely to be matched with a recipient patient needing an organ of that size, blood type, and other pertinent criteria.
(II) Transplant tourism. In 2007, the United Nations expressed concerns about a rising number of "transplant tourism" cases -where people in countries including Paki-160. This is evidenced by the allocation policies that give priority scoring to patients with the same or similar medical characteristics such as blood type. See UNOS 3.6, supra note 100.
161. /d. 162. There is an increased likelihood of a good match between first potential recipient and the offered donor organ; therefore, there is a decreased chance that a surgeon would decline the organ for that particular patient. See supra note 122. stan, Egypt, and the Philippines were selling their body parts to people from other countries. 163 Because of advancements in transplantation surgery, more patients seel4 and are eligible for, organ transplantation. 164 However, waiting lists have remained long and some wealthy patients have turned to purchasing organs and tissues that are not essential for survival from the less fortunate in other countries. 165 Farhat Moazam of the Sindh Institute of Urology and Transplantation notes the increased number of people traveling to Pakistan to buy kidneys, saying, "There are villages that are in the poorer parts of Pakistan where as many as 40 to 50 percent of the population of the village we know only has one kidney." This is a prime example of the fear that Congress had of making the "poor a source of spare parts for the rich" when it enacted NOT A. 166 While the practice of transplant tourism may give a patient access to a desperately needed organ, it may also place the patient in a perilous position. Patients receiving transplants in foreign countries take on the risks associated with having a surgical procedure in a jurisdiction not governed by the safety standards that apply in the United States. Thus, the patient may have higher risks of infection and of receiving an organ that is not a medically appropriate match.
While the natural instinct is to think ofHHS's goal of maximum survival rates in terms of the recipient, it should also be thought of as the goal for living donors. This is not an issue when the donor is already deceased, but it is paramount in the case of a living donor who consents to donation of organs such as a kidney, partial lung, or bone marrow. According to Luc Noel of the World Health Organization's health and technology and pharmaceuticals unit, many of the people who sell their organs and tissues are not given proper follow-up medical care and their health risks increase, thus decreasing their potential for survival. 167 Noel further explains that "[l]ive donations are not without risk, whether the organ is paid for or not. The donor must receive proper medical follow-up but this is often lacking when he or she is seen as a means to making a profit." 168 Those opposed to allowing patients to wait list themselves at multiple transplant centers may argue that "transplant tourism" is occurring right now while multiple listing is allowed. However, disallowing multiple wait listing may increase the likelihood that the wealthy will turn to this practice. 163 
